They were not widely adopted until several years after the Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers had given them its official support in the mid-1960s. Similarly, the famed “quality circles” did not appear as influential as I expected. Because of government regulations against women working after 10 p.m., very few Japanese facilities operate more than two shifts a day. Nor do the Japanese run this equipment at higher rates or for longer hours than U.S. plants.Īutomation consisted mainly of simple materials-handling equipment used in conjunction with standard processing equipment-just as it is here. The few “intelligent” robots I encountered were largely still experimental the general level of technological sophistication that I observed was not superior to (and was usually lower than) that found in comparable U.S. What I Did Not Seeįor the most part, Japanese factories are not the modern structures filled with highly sophisticated equipment that I (and others in the group) expected them to be. Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (New York: Harper & Row, 1979). Robert Cole, Japanese Blue Collar: The Changing Tradition (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1971).Ĭhie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1970).Įzra F.
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Vogel, “Guided Free Enterprise In Japan,” HBR May–June 1978, p. Van Zandt, “How to Negotiate in Japan,” HBR November–December 1970, p. Richard Tanner Pascale, “Zen and the Art of Management,” HBR March–April 1978, p. Marshall, “Japanese Business Ideology and Labor Policy,” Columbia Journal of World Business, Spring 1977, p. Drucker, “The Price of Success: Japan Revisited,” Foreign Affairs, August 1978, p.
Drucker, “Japan Gets Ready for Tougher Times,” Fortune, November 3, 1980, p. Drucker, “What We Can Learn From Japanese Management,” HBR March–April 1971, p. (See the sidebar for a list of related reading.) Instead, I will focus simply on how the Japanese manage their manufacturing functions. They are all important topics, but all have been the subject of innumerable books and articles. In describing some of the ways in which this “hammering” has been done, I shall not discuss the effect of Japanese cultural or social norms on management behavior, the distinctive aspects of Japanese management systems, or the virtues of Japanese industrial policy. In the factories I visited, all the nails appeared to have been hammered down. “The nail that sticks up is hammered down,” says the Japanese proverb. The Japanese have achieved their current level of manufacturing excellence mostly by doing simple things but doing them very well and slowly improving them all the time. Instead, it is something much more difficult for us to copy it is the factory of today running as it should. We in the United States, with our technical ability and resources, ought then to be able to duplicate it. If it were, it might be, curiously, far less of a threat. The modern Japanese factory is not, as many Americans believe, a prototype of the factory of the future. My research (see my note on this page for a detailed description) suggests that this new stereotype is probably as incorrect as the old one. Today, shocked and awed by the worldwide success of Japanese products, Americans tend to rationalize Japan’s industrial prowess by imagining gleaming factories peopled by skillful robots-both human and otherwise-all under the benevolent sponsorship of “Japan, Inc.” Twenty years ago, most Americans pictured the Japanese factory as a sweatshop, teeming with legions of low-paid, low-skilled workers trying to imitate by hand, with great effort and infrequent success, what skilled American and European workers were doing with sophisticated equipment and procedures.
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